Wednesday, March 6, 2019
Why do Middle Eastern and North African countries?
Joseph Waweru Why do Middle Eastern and North African countries lack republican governments? Is it the Arabic language or the Moslem faith? Columbia University scholars, Alfred Stephan and Graeme B. Robertson, seem to acquire the answers. In regards to Arabism and Islam, the duo classifies nations associated with the former as democratic underachievers and the latter as overachievers. A states classification as an overachiever/underachiever is establish upon their Gross Domestic Product Per Capita (GDPpc).In addition, they observe semipolitical rights on a scale to help them determine which states exhibit electoral private-enterprise(a)ness. They structure their reason into one-third phases quantitative, qualitative, and implications of the antecedent phases results. Finally, Stephan and Robertson offer possible solutions and scenarios that must take consecrate in order for the political atmosphere in Arab countries to transform. The data utilize comes from the independe nce in the World The Annual Survey of Political Rights and civil Liberties by Freedom House and Ted Gurrs legislation Project.The year 1972 is elect as the suitable year to compare the data from both sources. Freedom in the World ranks nations on a scale of 1-7 whereas 1 is the highest and 7 is the lowest. Nations that are ranked 3 (and above) are considered electoral competitive. The Polity Project ranks nations from strong autocratic (-10) to strong democratic (+10). Nations that are ranked at least (+4) are classified as electoral competitive. What constitutes as electoral competitive? According to the duo, government positions must be filled through fair elections.Governments like Egypt cannot bar individuals and parties from participating in elections. Secondly, high government positions should be filled with individuals who are elected though fair means, unlike Lebanon, whose executive and parliamentary government is authoritarian. In addition, a nation must meet these crit eria for at least three geezerhood to be considered electorally competitive. They also emphasize that electoral competitiveness is not republic but a prerequisite for it. The use of Arabic and Muslim interchangeably reflect the common misconception that the two words mean the same they do not.The former represents regions that speak Arabic and the latter represents regions that practice Islam. Using this template, Stephan and Robertson crowd their findings into Arab Muslim, Arab non-Muslim, and non-Arab Muslim-majority. From the onset, we notice that Arab countries have relatively weak political and electoral rights. lonesome(prenominal) Lebanon, one of the sixteen Arab countries and coincidentally the only Muslim-majority state in this group, had three years of consecutive strong electoral rights. No Arab country had tailfin years of consecutive strong political rights (32).On the contrary, 38% of the thirty non-Arab Muslim countries examined had strong political and electoral rights for three consecutive years art object 27% of the same group went for five consecutive years. The likelihood of a non-Arab Muslim country to be electoral competitive was 2000% higher than an Arab Muslim state. This extensive gap reiterates the authors claim that Arab states are associated with the lack of democratic zeal. In the quantitative phase, Stephan and Robertson examine GDPpc. They search for a link between levels of income and political rights.They characterize them as follows Non-Arab Muslim states whose GDPpc is under $1500 are great electoral overachievers, those that are under $3500 are electorally non-competitive and those that are over $5500 are electorally competitive. on that point are no electoral underachievers at heart this group. For Arab Muslim states, there is not a country whose GDPpc is below $3500. In addition, there are uncomplete great electoral achievers nor electoral competitive states. In fact, 44% of the countries in this group are elector al underachievers and their GDPpc is over $5500.They assert that there is no Muslim gap in regards to political rights. The qualitative phase deals with the character of government. They state that in non-Arab Muslim countries, like Senegal, Turkey, and Niger, powerful incumbents have been voted surface of office by constituents. Niger is an interesting case since its GDPpc is equal to that of Yemen, an Arab majority state, further its ranked (+4) and Yemen ranked (-2) on the Polity Project scale. In addition, Arab countries are classified into three groups complete autocratic states, liberalizing, and those that once showed annunciate to be democratic.The authors suggest that election bans, coercion, fraud, civil war, and military coups are to shoot for the lack of democratic governments in Arab countries. The findings of Stephan and Robertson also seem to counter prior arguments made by other scholars. For example, it is thought that economic development leads to res publica because development correlates with greater political meshing. The authors disagree with this notion. They compare political participation between India and the United States and conclude that the poor members of the former are much politically involved than those of the latter.They also disagree with the theory that differences in languages and ethnicities within a society are detrimental to democracy. They claim that electoral competitive states actually began with the high levels of ethnolinguistic fragmentation while electoral non-competitive states had low levels. In conclusion, Stephan and Robertson believe the electoral gap is an Arab one, not Muslim. Factors such as their inheritance to the Ottoman Empire and their failure to transition from authoritarian government relieve the gap.In addition, they believe that if the Arab world recognized each other as licit and sovereign nations and if military spending was reduced in favor for domesticated improvement, then democracy should form in the region. They believe democracy willing be achieved through internal means rather than external. And they are right. 8 years after this essay was written, Arab countries like Libya, Yemen, Tunisia, Egypt, Algeria, and Morocco are becoming democratic mainly due to internal pressures.
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