Principal Strengths And Weaknesses Of Norwegian Integration Politics Essay

Principal Strengths And Weaknesses Of Norse Integration Politics EssayThe extraneous policy of the European Union (EU) compromises ii major tools. First, deepen dictates a horizontal (among members) process where member states tie up their relations on stronger grounds. Second, enlargement is associated with a vertical growth ( amidst members of the EU and the buttocksdidate countries) that absorbs impertinently members into the Union creating peeled grocery stores, new employment possible, and a wider geographical status. The basic residual mingled with these two processes is that the latter must also entangle the satis naval divisionicularion of an outsider (i.e. the candidate country). As strange as it may sound to a Turkish citizen, slopped to countries ar willing to favor out the so-called opportunity of suitable an EU member.Any boldness of opposition to the European Union or to the project of European integrating, commonplacely labeled Euroscepticism, g et ins from many different quarters and spans across the political spectrum. unitary basic idea is that European integration might be t shutdowned to(p) by a certain disintegration of the political system at the subject area level. In the recent European Parliament elections, many Eurosceptics entered the European Parliament, thus extracting that Euroscepticism is on the rise across Europe.In surveying the genius of Euroscepticism across European states, Szczerbiak and Taggart (2000) identified Soft and Hard Euroscepticism which implicitly suggest particular features of Eurosceptical attitudes to Europe.For Hard Eurosceptics, the EU may be opposed because it embodies some previously identified enemy (e.g. capism for communism, mixerism for the right, bureaucracy for populists, supra home(a)ism for nationalists, or neo-liberalism for socialists). For Soft Eurosceptics, the EU is problematic when it development runs counter to involvements, policies or issues they support.(Sz czerbiak and Taggart 2008)Euroscepticsm in NorwayIn the Norse context, Euroscepticism is usually associated with the question of rank. To the question why the membership issue was and is so hotly debated in Norway there is no mavin answer, simply rather several partial ones.A leading skilled in the field of political behavior, Professor Henry Valen, points to the interplay of history, geography and social structure(Miles 1996). diachronicly, centuries of foreign rule first by the Danes, then by the Swedes and the fact of being a young nation (i.e. Norways comparatively recent independence since 1905) made many Norses fierce patriots. To this should be added the large geographical outdo to mainland Europe. The country has traditionally pursued a policy of non-involvement in European conflicts.Furthermore, the Norwegian Euroscepticism can be traced to both the economic and pagan territorial cleavages that shape the Norwegian party system, thus cutting across the main left-r ight dimension in Norway i.e. socio-economic rival between Labour and the Conservatives. (Eliassen and setting hen 2003). The centre-periphery cleavages derived from the national revolution and the rural-urban cleavages that were arose during the industrial revolution are other two explanatory dimensions of Euroscepticsm in Norway (Rokkan and Urwin 1983). Domestic politics reflect economic inequalities and conflicts of interest stemming from the huge geographic extension of the country from to the south to north and the open frame in living conditions between the densely inhabited and industrialized areas of south and the thinly populated rural and coastal districts. Furthermore, throughout the EU debates there were unusual but strong alliances between farmers and fisherman, urban radicals, and partisans of linguistic, religious and teetotalist counter-cultures. Miles (1996) finds that on just about of these dimensions there has been a remarkable stability since the azoic 197 0s.The economic dimension of Norwegian Euroscepticism is illustrated in the sectors that face uncertainty or decreased subsidies if exposed to free trade and ambition, primarily agriculture and fisheries, but also to a smaller extent the public sector. Fear that integration might undermine Norways regional policy, which entails both economic transfers and positive diversity in the forms of tax-breaks and other financial incentives, provides further grounds for economic opposition.In basis of indistinguishability or culture, European integration has been perceived as a potency or all-important(a) threat to Norways moral-religious heritage (Eliassen and baby-sitter 2003).Foreign and tribute policy added as further dimension to the Norwegian Euroscepticism. Until 2000, there was scarce evidence of that Norway was responding to the end of the Cold War and ever-changing military and security realities of the 1990s, and the distance between Norwegian and EU security policy was grea ter than at the beginning of the decade (Eliassen and Sitter 2003). This is grow partly in the perception that Norway is a different country, in terms of either geopolitics or its world-wide profile. The EU and the USs changing cash advancees to security and denial (beyond sole focus on traditional concerns of defense of state bounders), has short(p) effect on the Norwegian foreign and security policy. However, even in narrow terms of security concerns, Norway is finding that its non-NATO neighbours are change magnitudely addressing regional concerns through the EU institutions. Given its NATO membership and geostrategic position, Norway would be in a prime position to play a strong part in shaping the EUs emerging security and defense policy. Thus, even in the absence of EU membership, Norway joined the Schengen organization on police cooperation and dodge control and performs surveillance on the European It has also established close cooperation with the EU on its Common Foreign and Security constitution (CFSP).Historical outline of Norways foreign economic relations since independenceNorway is no rum to complex relations with the outside world (Claes and Fossum 2002). Its foreign policy has historically striven to strike a balance between internationalism and national self-assertion. Although unify under a leafy vegetable king as early as 872, it lost its independence in the late Middle Ages, was ruled by Denmark from 1390 to 1814, and then was the possession of the Swedish king until obtaining independence in 1905.In order to find the connection between a nations national identity operator and her foreign policy, one must first deal with whether Norwegian identity formation has yet ended up with a solid national identity. Anthony Smith (1993) outlines fundamental features of a national identity as oftentimes(prenominal) a historic territory (homeland) normal myths and historical memories a common mass public culture including dialect langu ages and luckd customs/traditions common legal rights and duties for all members and a common economy with territorial mobility for members. Internalizing Smiths features of national identity as well as making, Norwegian society has come up with an accomplished national identity without question.The main priority in Norwegian foreign and security policy after the Second humanness War was always the Atlantic human relationship, built around NATO membership and a strong reliance on the unite Kingdom and the United States. In 1960 Norway joined the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) which included the United Kingdon, Finland, Sweden, Austria, and Liechtenstein. However, Norways applications to join the European Community in 1962 and 1967 and vetoed by France indicated that there was likely for conflict in the Norwegian political system concerning stronger orientation towards the European Community. The opposition was non limited to the internal dimensions. Externally, members hip meant a potential break with the traditional non-supranational Nordic and EFTA liftes. As a consequence, it was felt by many Norwegians that Nordic cooperation might be jeopardized by opting for EC membership.The 1972 distressIn the 1972 referendum on EC membership, a majority of 53 percentage of the population voted against. Community to ensure duty-free trade for manufactured goods, the European question receded from its political agenda. The negative referendum outcome caused something like a political earthquake in Norway. It marked a broad popular testify against the exclusive competence of the g all overnment to handle questions of foreign policy and international economics generally and against EC membership specifically. The No in a way became part of the Constitution, standing above the politics, the Storting (parliament) and the political parties.Despite the rejection in 1972, and the following silent treatment of the membership issue, the prospect of the Single E uropean Market triggered negotiations to link the EFTA states with the EC through the creation of the European frugal argona agreement (EEA). As an intergovernmental agreement between the EU and the trine remaining EFTA partners (Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway), the EEA became the backbone of Norway s economic relationship with the EU.The vote against membership of the European Community in the 1972 set the scene for an approach to European integration based on an ever closer cooperation short of actual membership. Despite the rejection of membership, Norway was required to respond to and accommodate European integration. What started as bilateral relationships between each EFTA member and the EU evolved into coordinated multilateral fundamental interaction in the early 1980s. (Eliassen and Sitter 2003)The 1994 No referendum to EU membershipIn the wake of the 1994 referendum , in Norway, enormous offshore rock oil and gas resources had been developed, increasing the level of Norwegian exports and adding one more sensitive sector to the Norwegian negotiation agenda with the EU. In the EU, a more ambitious cathexis was employed both to harmonize economic regulations of the members in order to force a common market and economic union, and also to create a political union with common foreign policy. The impact of these changes together with political considerations, including loss of sovereignty in critical decision-making areas, made the distance between Norway and the Union extended. The No slogan EU campaigns 1994 slogan centered on three words environment, solidarity and national rule all of which were threatened by the Union.Norwegian Method of European IntegrationThe combination in progressively close cooperation in a growing range of policy sectors eyepatch excluding the possibility of full membership has come to represent a join-as-much-as-we-can-get-away-with approach to European integration on the governments part has been called the Norweg ian mode of European integration (Eliassen and Sitter 2001). The results in both 1972 and 1994 referendums were marginal No majorities, and this has been combine with a permanent pro-integration majority in Parliament, hence the basis for the Norwegian method of European integration.Strenghts of the Norwegian method in European integrationThe European Economic Area (EEA) has been, is and will be the cornerstone of Norwegian involvement in European integration. The deal entails comprehensive membership in the EUs Single European Market, and well-nigh Norwegian parties consider a well-functioning EEA an essential prerequisite for Norway non applying for full membership of the EU. Enlargement of the Single European Market was, of course, both for the EU and the EFTA countries, the key motive behind the EEA agreement (leaving aside the broader political goals of extending European integration), and this is perhaps the aspect of the EU Norway relationship that has worked best.Nevert heless, under the EEA arrangement Norway has seen much better economic development over the last decade than the EU average. The Norwegian North Sea oil wealth is almost a blessing for the Norwegian economy, but not the only, explanation for this. In most sectors, the differences between the EEA and EU arrangements for trade in the Single Market are minor. In several respects, Norway has even outperformed the EU. sideline rates construct fluctuated, but with some lag they have followed the Euro-zone. The government debt was eliminated, the foreign trade surplus grew, non-petroleum industrial investment increased and argumentation did not emigrate to the Euro-zone. To be sure, the economic slowdown in the fount years of this century also hit Norway, but less gravely than most of the EU member states. Unemployment in Norway stand (relatively stable) at the end of 2009 at around 3 percent, about half the EU average. This can be put down largely to the relatively tight pecuniary p olicy pursued in Norway, even in the face of the come-on to use more oil money. In fact, a large breaker point of convergence between Norway and the Euro-zone in terms of monetary policy has interpreted place despite the lack of a formal relationship.Norways has secured ad-hoc participation in several EU policy initiatives beyond those covered by the EEA The most spectacular of these, are the Schengen arrangement on passport free get and associated policies and Norways close cooperation with the EU on its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).Perhaps most significantly, the EU-Norway relationship is dynamic. Although this pith that the EEA treaty is upgraded when the EU enlarges, most of the responsibility is on the three EFTA members unilaterally to adapt to developments in the EU. This means both EU Treaty change and substantial developments in EU policy.Weaknesses of the Norwegian method in European integrationThe Norwegian quasi-membership in the EU (Eliassen and Sitter 2004) entails ever-closer cooperation, and the advantages of the supposed discretion that such arrangements entail shrinks with the deepening and widening of the EU.The first challenge is associated with the deepening of the EU. Although the EU as a whole is generally pleased with Norways performance, it shows little interest in develop this system much further to accommodate deepening of European integration. The EEA and Schengen systems are static compared to the very dynamic developments within the EU. Both arrangements are becoming ever smaller parts of the whole, and this is particularly evident when the EU moves into new areas such as counter-terrorism. In other rapidly developing areas such as foreign, security and defense policy, the overall Norwegian strategy is not always clearly developed, and the EU side justifiable questions whether Oslo is disposed(p) to accept the full implications of ad hoc participation in any assumption initiative.The price for access the Single Market is accepting EU market regulation and competition policy. In terms of the free movement of goods, services, capital and labour, there is little difference between the EEA agreements and full EU membership, and the EEA competition policy has brought a degree of supranationalism to an otherwise intergovernmental agreement. Although Norway has adopted less to EUs competition policy than most member states, it has partially adopted the EUs prohibition approach and remains under pressure to follow EU states in adapting to the EU system (Eliassen and Sitter 2003).The EUs eastern enlargement, or widening, makes up the second agent of the challenge of the future and the dilemma of quasi-membership. The tenfold increase in the slant for Norways access to the EU Single Market agreed as part of the EEA enlargement deal not only illustrates the shifting balance between the costs and benefits of quasi-membership (and some EU states perception of Norway as a deep relative who is unwill ing to contribute to the common good), but also the potential consequences of the growing asymmetry between the EU and EFTA partners in the EEA.Conclusion Are Norwegians as Eurosceptic as we often think?The question of how and to what extent Norway should get into in European integration has been the most important issue in national politics since the Second World War. The current Norwegian method of European integration lies between the alternatives of full membership and withdrawal from the EEA.At the same time, Norways non-membership of the EU understood as economically sensible for a country rich on natural resources is seen by most of the EU members as an indicator of self-reliance and national independence which suggests cultural invagination and a lack of need to actively trade and communicate in cultural, scientific and commercial matters with the rest of Europe.Despite this quite false house painting that is developing, are Norwegians as Eurosceptic as we often think? In well-off of this, I have identified four arguments against the standard story of Norwegian EuroscepticismHigh degree of integration with European markets when looking at the share of import and export from/to EU of total (2000-2009)High degree of accord with EU Norms, revealed through the percentage of EU directives not transported (EU and EEA scoreboards) between 1997-2009 right smart pragmatism by Norwegian political parties (i.e. there is a difference between talking and acting). All parties have governed on the EEA and if it was not supported, at least it was accepted as a compromiseNorwegian citizens have average attitudes towards European unification (European Social Survey 2008).Thus, a general lesson for the study of Euroscepticism is that it fails to grasp the distinction between opposition to European integration and opposition to EU membership. It tends to overemphasize the significance of formal membership and tailor many different Norwegian ties to the EU. Member ship is not so much a question about the EU, but primarily about national issues in Norway, as in most of the member states.